INDIAN ARMY LANDS IN KASHMIR BY ABDUL MAJID ZARGAR
There is now abundant evidence to suggest that following Gandhi’s visit to Kashmir, Hari Singh had by the end of August 1947 decided to join India. All he was waiting for was an ‘auspicious occasion’ to do so.
Whatever might have been Hari Singh’s earlier inclination regarding future dispensation of Kashmir, there is now abundant and credible evidence to suggest that following Gandhi’s personal visit to Kashmir and the Poonch agrarian uprising on oppressive tax system, he decided by the end of August 1947 to join India and was waiting only for an “auspicious occasion” to do so. M C Mahajan, then Kashmir’s prime minister designate met Nehru in Delhi mid-September to discuss the modalities of joining. As he writes in his autobiography Looking Back, “I told Nehru the terms on which the Maharaja wanted me to negotiate with India. Maharaja is also ready to introduce necessary reforms in the administration of the State and release Sheikh Abdullah. Nevertheless it was increasingly clear that if Maharaja was going to accede to either Dominion, it would be India” (page 126). (See also Origins of a dispute: Kashmir 1947, by Prem Shanka Jha, page 47-49.)
Whatever might have been Hari Singh’s earlier inclination regarding future dispensation of Kashmir, there is now abundant and credible evidence to suggest that following Gandhi’s personal visit to Kashmir and the Poonch agrarian uprising on oppressive tax system, he decided by the end of August 1947 to join India and was waiting only for an “auspicious occasion” to do so. M C Mahajan, then Kashmir’s prime minister designate met Nehru in Delhi mid-September to discuss the modalities of joining. As he writes in his autobiography Looking Back, “I told Nehru the terms on which the Maharaja wanted me to negotiate with India. Maharaja is also ready to introduce necessary reforms in the administration of the State and release Sheikh Abdullah. Nevertheless it was increasingly clear that if Maharaja was going to accede to either Dominion, it would be India” (page 126). (See also Origins of a dispute: Kashmir 1947, by Prem Shanka Jha, page 47-49.)
Pursuant to the above parleys, the Maharaja released Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah on 29 September. To strengthen his defense structure, he simultaneously placed an indent for military supplies with the government of India, on 1 October with an ostensible purpose of quelling the Poonch uprising. This was followed by a request that Indian forces be stationed near the border so that they could be called at a short notice in case of need. As a follow-up measure, Indian Home Minster Sardar Patel wrote to the defence minister, Baldev Singh, on 7 October, “I hope arrangements are in place to send immediately supplies of arms and ammunition to Kashmir State. If necessary, we must arrange to send them by Air” (Patel’s Correspondence, Durga Das, page 57). To this point of time there was neither any plan nor indication of any tribal incursion into Kashmir.
General Lockhart raised a pertinent query: How could arms be supplied to Kashmir, an independent State? A reference was made to an earlier decision taken regarding Hyderabad, which had not acceded to India by then. Hearing the army commander’s views, Sardar Patel turned furious
When the proposal of sending military equipment was received by the Indian defense ministry, the commander in chief, General Lockhart, raised a pertinent query as to how could arms be supplied to an independent State—Kashmir—which had not acceded to the Indian dominion? In this connection a reference was made to an earlier decision taken by a joint defense council that no arms should be made available to Hyderabad which had not acceded to India by then. Though the decision was specific to Hyderabad, it provided a precedent against sending arms to Kashmir (Mountbatten Papers, File MSS Eur F 200/246, India Office records, London). Hearing the army officer’s views, Patel turned furious. He arranged a meeting of the defense committee next day under the chairmanship of Governor General Lord Mountbatten. Sensing a strong urge of the Indian minister’s to extend military assistance to Maharaja, Mountbatten argued that it would be a folly to send troops into an independent State like Kashmir. He warned that Pakistan could do exactly the same thing, thus precipitating an inter-dominion war. As an alternative he suggested some sort of a “defense pact” or “provisional accession” with Kashmir to enable him to send troops there.
But Patel was not a man to care for such diplomatic niceties. He requested his friend Maharaja of Patiala to send his troops to Kashmir. By then Maharaja of Patiala had already acceded to the Indian Union and for all technical and legal purposes his forces, barring completion of some ceremonial events, were a part of the Indian army. In deference to Patel’s wishes, Maharaja of Patiala dispatched around 8,000 men of his forces who entered Jammu and Kashmir on 13 October. Out of this, around 3,000 men reached Srinagar by 18-19 October. Those who stayed in Jammu fully complimented the efforts of Maharaja’s Hindu forces, RSS activists and Sikh migrants to eliminate Muslims, rape their women and occupy the properties of those fleeing in desperation. A script for demographic change had cleverly been crafted and effectively executed, fully aided and abetted by the Patiala forces.
The news of Maharaja’s overtures and Indian military assistance travelled to Pakistan. On 14 October, the Dawn newspaper carried headline as “Kashmir’s accession to Indian Dominion regarded as foregone conclusion”. A similar news dispatch was sent by Margaret Parton, a widely respected journalist working with New York Herald Tribune, who had arrived in Kashmir from Peshawar the earlier week. Meanwhile Kashmir was in crisis and reeling under the shortage of fuel and essential commodities due to a condition which the Kashmir administration described as an economic blockade enforced by Pakistan. But Pakistan narrated this as a mere disturbance in supplies due to anarchic conditions prevailing in the affected territories with traders and carriers reluctant to face danger to their lives and goods.
Gandhi was informed about the operation. The apostle of peace warmly approved: “I would not shed a tear even if the little Union force was wiped out bravely defending Kashmir. I would opt for violence of the brave instead of non-violence of a coward”
The Jammu genocide of Muslims highly infuriated the Poonch rebellions, most of whom were demobilized World War II veterans. They contacted their acquaintances and contacts in the NWFP for assistance in taking revenge and liberate Kashmir. This resulted in formation of a ragtag force of tribesmen mostly Masoods, Wazirs and Afridis, which proceed to Kashmir for its liberation. When they reached Baramulla, reports of atrocities like loot, abduction and rapes of women committed by them started pouring in. An attack on the Christian mission in Baramulla made headlines across the world. That these were highly exaggerated reports was later confirmed by Sheikh Saheb himself in his public address on 13 July 1953 at the Martyr’s Graveyard and as Alastair Lamb recorded later in his book, The genesis of Kashmir dispute, that “whatever happened in Baramulla is nothing as compared to the sufferings of Kashmiri men, women and children at the Indian Army’s hands since 1989” (page 187). He suggests that those massacres which could have been forestalled by the Indian military in 1947 “were not prevented; they were merely postponed for two generations, with Indians now the vandals”.
On 23 October, the Maharaja arrived at Srinagar after completing a tour of Jammu. He was apprised about the scale of tribal incursion launched very early the previous day. He sensed that this was the occasion he was looking for to accede to India. Noting that his own and a contingent of Patiala forces were insufficient to repulse the attack; he deputed Ram Lal Batra to Delhi with a power of attorney to enter an accession with Delhi on his behalf. But Patel wanted an accession duly signed by the ruler himself. Menon was deputed to prepare the papers and leave for Srinagar. According to him, he flew to Srinagar on the 25th and the accession was signed by Maharaja on 26 October. (Based on undisputable facts and documentary evidence, the signing is established beyond doubt to be ante-dated). On 27 October, the 1st Sikh Regiment of Indian Army, under the command of Col. Ranjit Rai, landed at the Srinagar airport. At 10.30 am on that day, Delhi received a wireless message from Srinagar conveying the news that the operation was a success. The National Conference hailed the arrival of Indian Army as aid coming through divine herons (Tair-n-Ababil).
At the planning stage, which had been made much earlier in August 1947, the decision was to send Ist/5th Gurkha Rifles to Srinagar which was changed at the last minute to Ist Sikh Regiment. The real reason for the change is the fact that Sikh Regiment, after having witnessed the horrors of partition in undivided Punjab, was comparatively better motivated to fight Muslims in Kashmir. Another reason appears to be the fact that Gurkha Rifles was largely headed by British officers, who were unwilling to step into an independent State and invite adverse international reaction. Before the departure of Indian forces from Safdarjang Airport, Gandhi was informed about the operation. The apostle of peace warmly approved of the dispatch of the Indian armed forces for the defense of the state by saying: “I would not shed a tear even if the little Union force was wiped out bravely defending Kashmir. I would opt for violence of the brave instead of non-violence of a coward.”
The writer is a practicing chartered accountant
The writer is a practicing chartered accountant
